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Abstract.  Many extreme right groups have had an online presence for some time 
through the use of dedicated websites. This has been accompanied by increased 
activity in social media websites in recent years, which may enable the 
dissemination of extreme right content to a wider audience. In this paper, we 
present exploratory analysis of the activity of a selection of such groups on 
Twitter, using network representations based on reciprocal follower and mentions 
interactions. We find that stable communities of related users are present within 
individual country networks, where these communities are usually associated with 
variants of extreme right ideology. Furthermore, we also identify the presence of 
international relationships between certain groups across geopolitical boundaries. 
Keywords: network analysis, social media, community detection, Twitter, extreme 
right 
1 Introduction 
Groups associated with the extreme right have maintained an online presence for some time [1 
,2], where dedicated websites have been employed for the purposes of content dissemination and 
member recruitment. Recent years have seen increased activity by these groups in social media 
websites, given the potential to access a far wider audience than was previously possible. In this 
paper, we present exploratory analysis of the activity of a selection of these groups on Twitter, 
where the focus is upon groups of a fascist, racist, supremacist, extreme nationalist or neo-Nazi 
nature, or some combination of these. Twitter’s features enable extreme right groups to 
disseminate hate content with relative ease, while also facilitating the formation of communities 
of users around variants of extreme right ideology. Message posts (tweets) by such groups, to 
which access is usually unrestricted, are often used to redirect users to content hosted on external 
websites, for example, dedicated websites managed by particular groups, or content sharing 
websites such as YouTube. These posts also assist in the mobilization of participants for 
subsequent interactions such as offline demonstrations or other offline activities.  
Our investigation has found that communities of users associated with extreme right groups 
are indeed present on Twitter. The primary objective of this analysis is the detection of such 
communities within individual countries, using network representations of user interactions. In 
this context, an interaction is defined as one user “mentioning” another within a tweet, where 
reciprocal mentions between users can be considered as a dialogue [3], potentially indicating the 
presence of a stronger relationship. For the purpose of this exploratory work, we have retrieved 
Twitter data, including profile information and posted tweets, for a selection of eight countries, 
using a sampling method that requires the identification of sets of core users who are considered 
to be highly relevant. A network representation is extracted for each of these country data sets, 
from which communities of related users are detected. Having ranked these communities based 
on their stability, we can describe them using the hashtags contained within tweets posted by the 
member users. Each such description can then be used in conjunction with manual analysis of the 
user profiles, tweets and external websites to provide an interpretation of the underlying 
community ideology.  
Our secondary objective is the identification of international relationships between certain 
groups that transcend geopolitical boundaries. This involves the analysis of two network 
representations of the interactions between the core users from the eight country sets, using the 
follower relationships and mentions dialogues. It appears that a certain amount of international 
awareness exists between users based on the follower relationship, while mentions interactions 
indicate stronger relationships where linguistic and geographical proximity are highly influential.  
In Section 2, we provide a description of related work based on the online activities of 
extremist groups. The generation of the Twitter data sets, using profile data and tweets for users 
from each country of interest, is then discussed in Section 3. Next, in Section 4, we describe the 
detection of local extreme right communities within individual countries, including the 
methodology used for network derivation, community detection, stability ranking and description 
generation. In this exploratory analysis, we focus on two case studies, using the USA and 
Germany networks, where we offer an interpretation of a selection of these communities. Due to 
the sensitivity of the subject matter, and in the interests of privacy, individual users are not 
identified; instead, we restrict discussion to known extreme right groups and their affiliates. 
Analysis of the international relationships between extreme right groups from the eight countries 
is presented in Section 5. Finally, the overall conclusions are discussed in Section 6, and some 
suggestions for future work are made.  
 
2 Related Work 
The online activities of different varieties of extremist groups including those associated with the 
extreme right have been the subject of a number of studies. Burris et al. [2] used social network 
analysis to study a network based on the links between a selection of white supremacist websites. 
They found this network to be relatively decentralized with multiple centres of influence, while 
also appearing to be mostly undivided along doctrinal lines. Similar decentralization and multiple 
communities were found by Chau and Xu [4] in their study of networks built from users 
contributing to hate group and racist blogs. They also found that some of these groups exhibited 
transnational characteristics. The potential for online radicalization through exposure to jihadi 
video content on YouTube was investigated by Conway and McInerney [5]. A continuation of 
this work by Bermingham et al. [6] included network analysis of the associated YouTube users, 
where it was suggested that a potentially increased online leadership role may be attributed to 
users claiming to be women, according to centrality, network density and average speed of 
communication. Sureka et al. [7] also studied the activity of extremist users within YouTube, 
investigating content properties along with hidden network communities.  
In a similar approach to that of Burris et al. , Tateo [8] analyzed groups associated with the 
Italian extreme right, using networks based on links between group websites. A combination of 
social network analysis and content analysis methods were used. Caiani and Wagemann [9] 
studied similar Italian groups along with those from the German extreme right. They found the 
German network to be structurally centralized to a greater extent than that of the Italian groups. A 
related study by Caiani and Parenti [10] concluded that Spanish extreme right groups do not 
exploit the Internet for the purposes of communication and mobilization to the same degree as 
other countries. The contents of websites belonging to central nodes within Russian extreme right 
networks were analyzed by Zuev [11]. In their review of the conservative movement in the USA, 
Blee and Creasap [12] discuss the engagement in online activity as part of an overall mobilization 
strategy by the more extremist groups within it. McNamee et al. [13] analyzed the messages from 
a number of hate group websites, characterizing them using four themes; education, participation, 
invocation and indictment. Simi [14] suggested that the apparent decentralization of white 
supremacist groups according to, among other aspects, their online activity, should not be 
confused with disorganization or irrelevance. As the majority of this related work involved the 
study of dedicated websites managed by extreme right groups, we felt that an analysis of their 
activity in social media would complement this by providing additional insight into the overall 
online presence of these groups.  
3 Data Retrieval with User Curation 
Twitter data was collected to facilitate the analysis of contemporary activity by extreme right 
groups. As the hypothesis was that extreme right communities within social media would tend to 
be relatively smaller than mainstream communities, a form of snowball sampling was applied 
rather than using a random sampling approach. One of the objectives of this analysis was the 
detection of extreme right communities within individual countries. Given this, we used the 
curation method as proposed by Greene et al. [15] to generate core sets of relevant user accounts, 
one set per country of interest. This involved the initial identification of country seed user sets, 
where the user accounts within these seed sets were chosen based on a number of criteria (see 
below). Prior knowledge of extreme right groups informed the selection of countries of interest.  
Following the bootstrapping phase, the core sets were expanded over a number of iterations 
based on manual analysis of the users proposed in the recommendation phases (details of the 
final core sets can be found in Table 1). A selection of recommended users were added to the 
core sets using the following criteria:  
 
 Relevant profiles; for example, those containing references to known groups or employing 
extreme right symbols.  
 Recent tweet activity (within the last three months).  
 Similar YouTube user account profiles.  
 Follower relationships with known relevant users.  
 Users with self-curated lists (Twitter feature) containing relevant users.  
 Extreme right media accounts; for example, record labels, online music stores, radio 
stations, concert organisers etc. 
Table 1: Sizes of core user sets for eight countries of interest. 
   
Country  Number of Core Users     
France  25    
Germany  53    
Greece  14    
Italy  17    
Spain  42    
Sweden  21    
UK  32    
USA  32  
 
A number of recommended users were also ignored, such as inactive users, or those that were 
not deemed to be related to the extreme right. These included traditional conservative (e.g. 
centre-right) users, non-conformists/anti-establishment users considered to be left-wing, and 
conspiracy theorists. As the focus of the analysis was on extreme right groups, higher-profile 
politicians or political parties were ignored for the most part, with a minor number of these users 
included where it was felt that there was a close association with relevant users. Although 
expansion of the core sets using this criteria required a certain amount of subjectivity, it is felt 
that this was acceptable given that the requirement was to identify a relatively small number of 
relevant user accounts, and relevance is often immediately evident from manual profile analysis. 
A major obstacle was the language barrier, as the use of online translation tools were not always 
helpful in the case of ambiguous profiles. In such cases where the relevance of a user profile was 
inconclusive, the user was ignored. Although this leads to a disparity in core set size, for 
example, Spain and Germany have a relatively larger number of users, core set size does not 
necessarily influence the size of the communities detected within the generated networks, as 
demonstrated later in the case study sections.  
Profile data including followers, friends, tweets and list memberships were retrieved for each 
of the core users, as limited by the current Twitter API restrictions. The bootstrap process also 
retrieves a selection of profile data of those users having a follower relationship with a core user. 
In order to address possible incompleteness, additional profile data was also retrieved for any 
users having a reciprocal follower relationship with more than one core user, to produce the final 
data sets for analysis. As the Twitter follower relationship tends to exhibit lower reciprocity than 
other social networking sites [16], the understanding was that this action would be largely 
isolated to those users having a relatively stronger relationship with core users.  
 4 Local Community Detection 
Having retrieved the user data from Twitter, the interactions between users within the individual 
country sets were analyzed with the objective of detecting communities of related users. At the 
country level, an interaction is defined as one user “mentioning” another with the inclusion of 
“@<username>” within a tweet, where reciprocal mentions between users can be considered as a 
dialogue [3], thus potentially indicating the presence of a stronger relationship. A network is 
created with n  nodes representing users, and undirected weighted edges representing reciprocal 
mentions between pairs of users, with weights based on the number of mentions occurrences. 
Currently, all mentions occurrences are considered rather than selecting those from a specific 
time period. Any connected components of size < 10 are filtered at this point.  
We use the method of Greene et al. [17], which is a variant of the recent work by Lancichinetti 
& Fortunato [18], to generate a set of stable consensus communities from a reciprocal mentions 
network, where 100 runs of the OSLOM algorithm [19] are used to generate the consensus 
communities. In this analysis, we are primarily concerned with the detection of the most 
“significant” communities with the strongest signals in the network. Therefore, the consensus 
communities are ranked based on the stability of their members with respect to the corresponding 
consensus matrix. We employ the widely-used adjustment technique introduced by [20] to correct 
for chance agreement:  
  
(1)CorrectedStability(C)= Stability(C)− ExpectedStability(C)
1− ExpectedStability(C)
A value close to 1 will indicate that C is a highly-stable community. As higher values of the 
threshold parameter τ  used with the consensus method result in sparser consensus networks, and 
having tested with values of τ  in the range [0 . 1 ,0 . 8]  , we selected τ= 0 .5  as a compromise 
between node retention and more stable communities. Finally, community descriptions are 
generated using a TF-IDF vector for each community, where the terms are hashtags contained 
within tweets posted by users within the community. A description consists of the top ten hashtag 
terms ranked using their TF-IDF values.  
4.1 Case Study: USA 
A reciprocal mentions network (Fig. 1) was created for the USA core set and associated data, 
consisting of 835 nodes and 2501 edges, where 29 of the original 32 core set nodes were present. 
The consensus communities were then generated using the methodology described earlier. The 
consensus network generated with threshold τ= 0 .5  consisted of 672 nodes and 6876 edges. 
Fifty-five communities were detected, and a selection of relevant communities having high 
stability scores can be found in Table 2. 
 
  
 
Fig. 1: USA reciprocal mentions network - 835 nodes and 2501 edges, selected consensus 
communities are labelled. Node size is based on degree.  
 
Table 2: USA reciprocal mentions - selected consensus communities (consensus network 
threshold τ  = 0.5) 
      
Communities wi h core userst         
Id Colour Description  Size Core (%) Score
            
A    aryan, pipa, thewhiterace, shtf, wpww, masterrace, 
londonriots, ukriots, wwii, nazi  
11 2 (18%) 0.89
      
B    wpww, tcot, gop, truth, teaparty, trayvontruth, 
blackpower, sopa, mlk, treyvon  
24 2 (8%) 0.81
      
C    ubnp, wpradio, contest, wpww, pandora, wpwwgiveaway, 
nevershouldyouever, hch, rahowa, survival  
75 6 (8%) 0.81
      
D   prayforthis, glory, genocide, diversity, africans, 
antiracist, equality, asia, asians, mustsee  
11 3 (27%) 0.81
            
Communities wi hout core userst         
Id Colour Description  Size Core (%) Score
            
E    zumaspear, da, sa, afrikaans, anc, ancyl, zuma, 
southafrica, malema, afrikaners  
38 0 (0%) 0.91
      
F    rochdale, brighton, edl, mfe, uaf, islam, luton, 33 0 (0%) 0.85
dewsbury, bbcsml, labour  
Community A would appear to be national socialist/white power in nature, with the 
appearance of hashtags such as “aryan”, “thewhiterace”, “wpww” (white pride world wide), 
“masterrace” and “nazi”. An analysis of the users and associated profiles finds references to the 
American Nazi Party, along with other related terms such as 14 (a reference to a 14-word slogan 
coined by the white supremacist David Lane), and 88 (“H” is the 8th letter in the alphabet, and 88 
signifies “heil hitler”) in user names. There are also references to skinhead groups, including a 
website where related media and merchandise can be found for sale. Users appear to be mostly 
from the USA, although a small number of European users are also present. References to the 
London riots of 2011 are also made within tweets, where blame has been apportioned to non-
whites. “Pipa” refers to the “PROTECT IP Act”, which appears to be a shared concern among 
such groups with respect to potential curbs to civil liberties.  
Some similar white power themes appear in community B, whose description also includes 
“wpww”, although they would appear to be more subtle than those of community A. An analysis 
of the user profiles finds a certain number of North American white power users with some 
similar references as community A, albeit on a smaller scale. One of the core users promoting a 
radio station website could be considered influential here. The “trayvontruth” and “treyvon” 
hashtags refer to the recent fatal shooting in Florida of Trayvon Martin, a 17-year-old African-
American teenager. It appears that this story is being used to propagate a message of alleged 
persecution against whites. References to “tcot” (top conservatives on Twitter) and “gop” (Grand 
Old Party aka the USA Republican Party) can also be seen, indicating the presence of more 
traditional conservative users. However, this does not necessarily point to any official link 
between these groups. The appearance of the “sopa” (Stop Online Piracy Act) hashtag is most 
likely analogous to that of “pipa” in community A’s description.  
The users in community C form quite a large North American community which is primarily 
white power oriented, as can be seen from the frequent occurrences of “wpww” among the 
description hashtags, along with “rahowa” (RAcial HOly WAr). There are many national 
socialist references within the user profiles, and as with community A, many user names 
containing 14 and 88. In a similar fashion to community B, an external white power radio station 
website seems to be influential here, which correlates with some of the hashtags such as 
“wpradio”, “contest” and “wpwwgiveaway”. Most of the users in community D (both North 
American and European) appear to be connected with a number of white rabbit websites, which 
allege the existence of “white genocide”. Here, “antiracist” refers to the associated slogan “anti-
racist is just a code word for anti-white”. This community also contains one liberal user with a 
high-level of posting activity who has interacted with a certain number of the other white power 
users.  
Communities E and F are interesting as neither community contains a single user from the 
USA core set. However, an analysis of the users in both communities shows that reciprocal 
follower relationships with USA users are common. The users in community E appear to be 
white South Africans, with some profiles containing racist and national socialist references. 
Many tweets from these users relate to perceived cultural threats from black South Africans that 
are often retweeted by international users. Almost all of the description hashtags are related to 
South Africa, such as “anc” (African National Congress, the current governing party) and 
“afrikaners” (primarily white ethnic group descended from European settlers). Community F 
consists mostly of users associated with the English Defence League (“edl” hashtag), a group 
opposed to the alleged spread of militant islamism within the UK. Hashtags such as “rochdale”, 
“brighton”, “luton” and “dewsbury” are UK locations, most likely indicating various EDL 
subgroups, while “uaf” refers to the Unite Against Fascism group; a staunch opponent of the 
EDL. Although both communities E and F would appear to have a certain amount of awareness 
and interaction with other nationalities as indicated by the follower relationships, the majority of 
interaction seems to be at the local level if mentions interactions are assumed to represent 
stronger relationships.  
 
4.2 Case Study: Germany
 
  
 
Fig. 2: Germany reciprocal mentions network - 247 nodes, 646 edges, selected consensus 
communities are labelled. Node size is based on degree.  
 
A reciprocal mentions network (Fig. 2) was created for the Germany core set and associated 
data, consisting of 247 nodes and 646 edges, where 46 of the original 53 core set nodes were 
present. The consensus communities were then generated using the methodology described 
earlier. The consensus network generated with threshold τ= 0 .5  consisted of 167 nodes and 799 
edges. Eighteen communities were detected, and a selection of relevant communities having high 
stability scores can be found in Table 3. 
 
Table 3: Germany reciprocal mentions - selected consensus communities (consensus network 
threshold τ  = 0.5) 
 
 
      
Communities wi h core userst         
Id Colour Description  Size Core (%) Score
            
A    bollywood, lvz, geithainer, geithain, tdi, 
unsterblichen, gha, mephisto, imc, jcsyhra  
10 3 (30%) 0.89
      
B    saalfeld, gera, pcrecords, apw, 13februar, volkstod, 
otz, geraer, altenburger, rfd  
14 5 (36%) 0.79
      
C    130abschaffen, unibrennt, raz09, mobilisierungsvideo, 
golf, demokraten, spreelichter, meilederdemokratie, 
sfb, halloween  
10 2 (20%) 0.77
      
D   guben, spreelichter, apw, jingle, weltanschauung, 
vetschau, bock, 17august, podcast, altermedia  
24 10 (42%) 0.72
            
Communities wi hout core userst         
Id Colour Description  Size Core (%) Score
            
E    bamberg, flugblatt, ovg, trke, stolberg, ruhrgebiet, 
wattenscheid, vorstellungsflugblatt, rat, 
landesgartenschau  
8 0 (0%) 0.94
An analysis of the users in community A finds them to be primarily associated with the town 
of Geithain, near Leipzig in Sachsen. This can also be seen from hashtags such as “geithainer”, 
“geithain” and “gha”, along with the Leipzig-related hashtag “lvz” (Leipziger Volkszeitung - 
newspaper). Users belonging to various extreme right groupings are present, such as Freies Netz 
(“information portal” websites hosting related content) and the Junge Nationaldemokraten 
(Young National Democrats, youth wing of the extreme right Nationaldemokratische Partei 
Deutschlands - National Democratic Party of Germany - NPD). References to Aktionsbüros 
(coordination of activist activities) are also made. The “bollywood” hashtag refers to a Geithain 
business that has been subjected to repeated attacks by neo-Nazis, while “unsterblichen” 
(immortals) refers to anti-democratic flashmob marches that have been occurring sporadically 
throughout Germany. These protests are linked to Spreelichter, an extreme right group from 
Südbrandenburg that was recently banned by the local authorities. 1 They used social media to 
propagate national socialist-related material, including professional-quality videos of the marches 
themselves.  
                                                 
1 http://blog.zeit.de/stoerungsmelder/2012/06/19/das-ende-der-nazi-masken-
show_8923 
Like community A, the users in community B appear to be mostly related to a geographical 
location, namely the federal state (Bundesland) of Thüringen, where the towns of Altenburg, 
Gera and Saalfeld can be found. Most of the users are associated with Freies Netz, with a number 
from other parts of Germany. The “rfd” hashtag refers to “Rock für Deutschland” - a concert 
organised by the NPD in Thüringen which will take place in July 2012. Other relevant hashtags 
include “apw” (außerparlamentarischer Widerstand - non-parliamentary resistance) and 
“13februar”, a reference to the bombing of Dresden which began on February 13, 1945. This 
event is usually commemorated by extreme right groups each year. Also relevant is “volkstod” 
(death of the people/nation), which refers to the perceived destruction of German people and 
traditions since World War II, often mentioned in Spreelichter-related content.  
The binding theme of community C is related to the “130abschaffen” hashtag, which refers to 
demands for the abolition of a paragraph in the German penal code associated with the 
criminalization of incitement to hatred, along with denial and/or justification of the Holocaust 
and national socialist rule. Although other relevant hashtags such as “apw”, “volkstod” and 
“spreelichter” are present, some of the users have been inactive for some time, and it appears that 
these may have been replaced with new accounts. Other interesting hashtags are 
“mobilisierungsvideo” (mobilization video) and “unibrennt”, where the latter refers to a student 
protest movement. This movement appears to be unrelated, but the use of this hashtag by known 
extreme right users may be strategic as it could ensure the propagation of tweets to a wider 
audience.  
Community D is the largest of the selected consensus communities, and contains a wide range 
of users from groups such as Aktionsbüros/bündnis, Freies Netz, Junge Nationaldemokraten and 
Spreelichter/Unsterblichen. These users would appear to be quite active, with many “apw”-
related tweets, along with tweets containing URLs linking to content hosted on external websites 
such as YouTube or other dedicated websites. The “altermedia” hashtag refers to a collective of 
politically-incorrect/nationalist-oriented news websites, where the German website contains 
content such as Spreelichter articles and a section related to the NPD. “Guben” is a town in the 
state of Brandenburg on the border between Germany and Poland, and its many occurrences may 
indicate a geographical connection with Brandenburg, particularly as Spreelichter was also based 
in this state. It also appears that some of the users here are replacement accounts for older 
versions that are members of community C.  
Finally, as with the USA case study, a community without any core set users has been selected 
for analysis. In this case, all of the users in community E appear to be related to the NPD. The 
hashtags “bamberg” and “ruhrgebiet” refer to locations within Germany, and the presence of 
other hashtags such as “flugblatt” (flyer/leaflet/pamphlet) and “rat” (council/councillor) along 
with separate analysis of the tweet content may indicate mobilization prior to elections. 
Separately, the “türke” hashtag refers to people of Turkish descent, and is often used in tweets 
from community E (and other) users alleging the involvement of such people in criminal activity; 
a common accusation by German extreme right groups. Similarly, “stolberg” refers to the town 
where a German teenager was killed by non-Germans in 2008, which is also the focus of an 
annual extreme right commemoration.  
 5 International Relationships 
We also analyzed the international relationships between the various groups within the data sets, 
based on the interactions between the core users from the eight country sets (Table 1). Two types 
of undirected network were generated; a followers network consisting of user nodes and 
unweighted edges representing follower links between users, and a mentions network where 
edges were created for each instance of a user “mentioning” another with the inclusion of 
“@<username>” within a tweet. As with the country-based networks, only reciprocal edges were 
used in order to capture stronger relationships, all stored follower and mentions instances were 
included, and connected components of size < 10 were filtered. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: International core followers network (reciprocal) - 226 nodes, 1603 edges. Node 
size is based on degree.  
 
5.1 International Follower Awareness 
The international followers network can be seen in Fig. 3. As might be expected, most of the 
follower relationships are between users from the same country, although a certain number of 
international relationships are identifiable. It would appear that linguistic and geographical 
proximity is influential here, for example, there appears to be a close relationship between the 
Spanish and Italian (and to a lesser extent, French) users, with strong connections also between 
the UK and USA. Similar behaviour with respect to social ties in Twitter has been identified by 
Takhteyev et al. [21] and Kulshrestha et al. [22]. However, there appear to be some exceptions to 
the influence of geographical proximity, most notably, Swedish (yellow) and Italian (green) users 
that are not co-located with their respective country nodes. In both cases, the majority of tweets 
from these users are in English, which presumably ensures a wider audience. The former user is a 
Swedish representative of a pan-Scandinavian group espousing national socialist ideals, who 
appears to be interacting with many international users, particularly from the USA. This user has 
been increasingly active in recent months.  
The Italian user is a national socialist whose tweets often contain URLs to music or video 
content hosted on external websites, but it is unclear if a direct association exists with any 
particular group. From an analysis of other central nodes in the network (using betweenness 
centrality), it would seem that those involved in the dissemination of material (text, audio, video) 
with the use of external URLs, or media representatives such as extreme right news websites and 
radio stations, are attempting to raise awareness amongst a variety of international followers. This 
is especially the case when the English language is used.  
 
5.2 International Dialogue 
The follower-based relationship between international users could be considered as passive when 
compared with that of the mentions-based networks, where such interactions can represent actual 
dialogue between users. The mentions network in Fig. 4 can be seen to be somewhat smaller than 
the corresponding followers network in Fig. 3; for example, none of the Greek core users are 
present. Apart from this, the network has a similar structure to that of the followers network, in 
that most interaction occurs within individual country-based communities. Connections between 
these communities do exist, but are fewer than in the followers network. The influence of 
linguistic proximity appears to take precedence here, with the use of English playing a major role 
as mentioned in the previous section. For example, a relatively large number of connections 
remain present between the UK and USA users. In the case of the German community, while the 
followers network contains a number of connections with other international users, this has now 
been reduced to a single connection with a user acting as an English-language Twitter channel for 
a Swedish nationalist group. Similarly, the Swedish user co-located with the USA community is 
the same user as that in the followers network, who appears to be involved in many English-
based dialogues with international users.  
It should also be emphasized at this point that this analysis does not necessarily provide 
extensive coverage of the international relationships between all extreme right groups that are 
active on Twitter. As it is possible that the data retrieved from Twitter is incomplete, the 
objective is to demonstrate the existence of these relationships by means of an exploratory 
analysis. This caveat also applies to the country-based community analysis. 
  
 
Fig. 4: International core mentions network (reciprocal) - 184 nodes, 856 edges. Node 
size is based on degree.  
 
6 Conclusions and Future Work 
Extreme right groups have become increasingly active in social media websites such as Twitter in 
recent years. We have presented an exploratory analysis of the activity of a selection of such 
groups using network representations based on reciprocal follower and mentions interactions. 
The existence of stable communities of associated users within individual countries has been 
demonstrated, and we have also identified international relationships between certain groups 
across geopolitical boundaries. Although a certain awareness exists between users based on the 
follower relationship, it would appear that mentions interactions indicate stronger relationships 
where linguistic and geographical proximity are highly influential, in particular, the use of the 
English language. In relation to this, media user accounts such as those associated with extreme 
right news websites and radio stations, along with external websites hosting content such as 
music or video, are a popular mechanism for the dissemination of ideals among users from a 
variety of disparate groups.  
Although a certain number of the detected communities can be associated with a specific 
extreme right group or ideology, this is more ambiguous in other cases where communities 
appear to contain members from a variety of known groups. This may be a consequence of 
incompleteness in the data sets retrieved for this analysis. It may also be related to variances in 
Twitter usage patterns in different countries, for example, the use of Twitter tends to be more 
prevalent in the UK and the USA than in other countries such as Germany 2. The laws of 
different countries should also be taken into consideration, as an opinion that may be legally 
voiced in one country may not be permitted in another, particularly within the context of extreme 
right ideals. However, it may also be the case that social media websites are merely used by such 
groups to disseminate related material to a wider audience, with the majority of subsequent 
interaction occurring elsewhere.  
                                                
In future work, we will address the issue of incompleteness in the data sets, including the 
current disparity in core set sizes. Local community analysis of countries other than the USA and 
Germany will be performed, and we will collect data beyond the eight countries used in this 
analysis. We also plan to study the temporal properties of these networks which will provide 
insight into the evolution of extreme right communities over time.  
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